
ИСТОРИЯ

УДК 327.5

THE IMPACT OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER ON THE WORLD COMMUNITY

A. Yu. Prokofyeva

The paper deals with the problems of the international reaction to global ecological disasters. The after-effects of such catastrophes can be far-reaching for the world community. The Chernobyl disaster influenced not only the territory which was subject to radiation pollution but also the country it was part of. The foreign policy of the USSR became much affected by the catastrophe as it brought a certain change in mind of the heads of state and their attitude to this country. The research shows that certain measures are taken by the international community in order to prevent disasters of such kind in the future. The author claims that measures should be taken on the level of international relations as well.

Kew words: foreign policy, Soviet Union, ecological disaster, international reaction.

More than thirty years ago, the world was threatened with the catastrophe to reliably estimate the value and scale of which is still not possible. The explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant had disastrous consequences for the environment. Hundreds of Soviet citizens fell victim to the altar of the atom, and the immediate threat to the livelihood of the world community was created. The problems that had to be fought in 1986 had not previously been encountered in world practice.

The experience of Chernobyl affected not only the sciences and technology. All world governments were challenged, conditions were created in which the authorities had a choice in which direction to move further, how to avoid the possible repetitions of Chernobyl.

With the aim to study the international effect of a nuclear disaster, the period of time was selected starting with the date of the accident, April 26, 1986, ending with the date of the collapse of the USSR, which finally attributed the city of Pripyat and the elimination of the consequences of a nuclear explosion in it to the department of the Ukrainian government.

It is impossible not to say that both the invisible and quite tangible consequences of Chernobyl are felt today. In the area of the city of Pripyat, the

exclusion zone is preserved, free from any kind of life, and the state of the “frozen” nuclear power plant needs constant monitoring. The tragic continuity of the experience of the Chernobyl liquidators continues in Japan, which experienced a radiation emission at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant in 2011. Despite this, the time frame of this work allows us to trace precisely the turning point in the perception of international security policy. After all, only major shocks, the deadly proximity of danger can often become an impetus to making atypical decisions, developing new strategies and tactics of behaviour. Did they affect the further fate of the states? Bared or tempered them? In many respects, therefore, the period under review is symbolically completed simultaneously with the disintegration of the state that suffered the most damage from the catastrophe.

The subject of the research is the interpretation of the Chernobyl phenomenon in the international aspect. “What did the Pripyat disaster mean for foreign policy of the USSR and what did it inspire the leaders of the world nuclear powers?” – such is the problem of work. Particular attention is paid to the relations of the USSR and the USA, as states that for the most part of the 20th century and onward have been fighting for “nuclear leadership”.

The aim is to establish the relationship of the atomic explosion in Ukraine and changes in the USSR foreign policy, the cessation of the country's existence.

The objectives of the research are as follows:

- consideration of the position of the USSR in the international arena in the period under study from the point of view of Western and domestic authors and researchers;
- the definition of the policy of the USSR in relation to the United States;
- analysis of the role of Chernobyl in the aggregate causes of the collapse of the USSR.

Part of the information concerning the real state of affairs in the exclusion zone was published in the USSR only after 1989, when the "public gateways were opened" and a stream of publications, including Western magazines, poured into the country [1]. Today we can focus on declassified party documents, eyewitness notes, reports [2], the participants of the events themselves.

Materials from the book by A. Yaroshinskaya "Chernobyl. Big Lie" have been used in the paper. The author is a native of Ukraine, a publicist, and later a deputy specializing in nuclear non-proliferation issues. The book "presents a critical look at the policies of the USSR, publishes letters from residents of the exclusion zone, and also relies on the articles of the former Soviet professorship, and most importantly – on the forty secret Politburo protocols, copies of which were taken personally by the author a month before the collapse of the USSR" [1]. The validity of such a source can be questioned (the author claimed the genre to be "a documentary novel"). However, it ensured representation and social point of view, being part of the private investigation performed by the author. Thus, it proves valuable for this research.

Another reference work was the Sixth volume of a series of books on US international relations, published by the US State Department. The series is a collection of official documents in the field of international relations. The authors refer to the access to secret data, including those located in the R. Reagan Presidential Library. This allows to use the official chronicles of meetings of the heads of the United States and the USSR after 1986, to explore their development [3]. The newspapers and television

programs of the Soviet and Western media available on the Internet today have also been taken into consideration [4]. Documentaries of domestic and foreign production, containing interviews with witnesses of the disaster and those involved into it, have also been taken into account [5].

The second half of the twentieth century was marked by a whole complex of alternating vectors of the USSR's foreign policy. Inside each of them had multiple contradictions, but by exposing them to generalize, we can form a picture, against which events will unfold in 1986.

Hailed in 1960s L. I. Brezhnev's path to defusing international tensions was aimed at a relative expansion of contacts with the West. It yielded positive results in the sphere of mutual relations between the USSR and the USA. During this period they signed "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War", "Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", SALT-I and SALT-II treaties on the limitation of strategic weapons, the "Declaration on the Prevention of a Nuclear Catastrophe" [6]. Signing the Helsinki Declaration [7] 1975 secured postwar rights of the USSR on the European space.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s the USSR became an influential actor on the world political scene, the leader of the communist bloc, while at the same time its relations with the United States were approaching the dialogue based on a rational solution of common problems. However, the policy of detente did not stand the test of the conflict in Afghanistan and turned into an increase in the arms race. In other words, at the time of the Chernobyl disaster The USSR was one of the two major nuclear powers, a state whose ambitions were not limited to the leadership in the field of armaments.

Gorbachev's coming to power did not turn the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the demand for superiority continued. This is proved by the records made by Chernyaev, Assistant Secretary General, in which he wrote that "Gorbachev creates the image of the Soviet Union as a "world value"" [8]. At the same time nuclear safety has always remained the sphere of priority agreements for both the Soviet state and developed countries, whose existence in the bipolar world directly depended on the nuclear realities realizing nuclear power.

Since the time of the bombing of Japan by 1986 there have been more than 40 years, in

addition, for the countries of the West the location of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was too far to make them think about the nuclear bombing and its aftereffects. Whereas Chernobyl made people for the first time to realize that losing control over a nuclear plant can result releasing radioactive material “with extensive consequences for health and environment, which requires the implementation special measures” [9]. The tragedy occurred at 1 hours 23 minutes April 26, 1986. In the upper part of the reactor an explosion occurred, which caused a heat and destroyed part of the roof. At 3 hours 30 minutes the fire was extinguished [2].

On the day of April 26, the western community had no information about radioactive releases from the official authorities of the USSR. On May 13, 1986 in Moscow, meetings were held with representatives of embassies of foreign countries, as well as separately with the ambassadors of socialist countries. They received answers to all their questions [2]. Today this imperfection of the information exchange lasting for two weeks seems to be impossible; 30 years ago very few people could have imagined its fatality.

The first country that registered the emission of nuclides into the atmosphere at 6 am on April 27 was Sweden [10]. All sources agree on this. Scientists have determined that 4.4% of the total radioactive cesium fell in Sweden. The most affected territories were the northern provinces of the country. That day, many residents of Sweden were awaiting the results of the hockey championship, held in Moscow. At the same time, Forsmark NPP specialists recorded an increase in radiation background. The evacuation of personnel was announced, and the search for a leak began. Each worker was individually checked on a dosimeter. In the absence of identified causes, the NPP personnel were sent home, but the situation of information ignorance lasted until the evening of April 28 [11].

Soon the radioactive cloud has reached the limits of Finland. Later, 4.3% radioactive cesium was deposited there. Neither the media nor the government of the state could explain the pollution. Radiation Safety Center of Finland spoke of a “possible accident at one of the reactors” [12].

Further on nuclear pollution was detected on the territory of Yugoslavia. The Chernobyl disaster caused almost a fatal rain, the news about

unknown acid was accompanied by fear, according to the words of Serbian Ambassador to Ukraine Rade Bulatovic [13].

Overseas, in Canada in particular, the news of Chernobyl came from Sweden. The initial release affected not only Europe, but also led to the transfer of a small amount of radiation to China, Japan and the United States. The IAEA received information on the pollution of 23 Member States.

The official announcement of information about Chernobyl took place on April 28, 1986 at 21:00, and it was also the same data for the republics of the Soviet Union, and for Westerners. The news programme “Vremya” carried the following information: “An accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. One of the reactors was damaged. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the incident. The necessary assistance was provided to the victims. A government commission was established to investigate the incident” [14].

Swedish journalist Hedborg Elizabeth, who was at that time in Ukraine, says: “Then it was impossible so openly to call and ask ... The worst thing is that the lack of official information contributed to the emergence of various rumors” [11].

The reaction of the West was mixed. The line between resentment and sympathy was thin. On April 29 an article was published in “New York Times” where the Soviet government was accused of withholding information about the accident. The American media wrote about the percentage of pollution in the neighboring countries of the USSR, referring to their meteorological studies, and pointed to the repetitive nature of this recognized by the Secretary General of Nuclear Accidents [15].

The same position was largely lobbied in those April days by ABC. To their studio [16] they invited doctors, public figures, scientists. Assumptions were made about the contamination of all drinking water of the Dnieper basin. Among the guests was an American politician of the Soviet origin, Dmitri Simes, giving his opinion on the issue of Chernobyl: “Their (-the government of the USSR) instinct is to wait as long as possible and report as little as possible”. This view has been widely circulated in the West, and in support of it we can turn to R. Reagan’s entry in his diary. On April 30 the

President of the United States wrote: “The day was interrupted by a message about the accident in the Soviet Chernobyl. As usual, the Russians will not provide any facts...” [17].

A lot of negative feedback from America came to Gorbachev, who had been in office for year. The anti-Soviet campaign of the governments, politicians and the media of some NATO countries, especially the United States, intentionally exaggerating the actual scale of the accident was absolutely clear. Later, the “Pravda” newspaper wrote: “Some foreign agencies and all sorts of radio voices tried to sow panic, reporting about the death of thousands of people, about a nuclear explosion, about ramping exposure of almost the entire European part of the country and neighboring states ... What could be more disgraceful than gloating over misfortune?” [18].

Thus, immediately after the accident, Chernobyl provoked a new round of information war between the USSR and the USA. This is confirmed by declassified materials archives of the USSR. At the time when the whole world was talking about the threat that was The Soviet Union, the KGB, tried to prevent the thickening of clouds over Chernobyl by foreign media, gave them their agents, creating the appearance of complete security in Pripyat and its district [16]. At the same time, it was exceptional optimism and the absence of specific numbers that caused distrust of the Western sources.

In May 1986, IAEA experts were admitted to Moscow, in August Vienna hosted an international conference on the analysis of the causes of the Chernobyl accident and the assessment of the radiological consequences of this accident. The following were adopted in September: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident and a Radiological Emergency. In the context of the Iran-Iraq, the Afghan wars, the ongoing rivalry in the field of armaments, the governments of the USSR and the USA were put on the same side of the battle with atomic energy. Reagan said: “Rarely the interdependence of modern industrialized countries manifested itself more clearly than these days (Chernobyl days)”.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze, wrote in his book: “The Day of Chernobyl, as I called for myself April 26, 1986, became a new frontier of reference in the world history, a

new criterion of foreign policy. The then US president spoke in the same language with the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, whose thesis on the formation of a single interdependent world became the key position of the concept of a new political thinking. The day of Chernobyl instantly lifted the universal value – life – over the “class consciousness” [19].

Indeed, the international position of the USSR was twofold. Along with the criticism of the Soviets, even in the US news bulletins there were the words: “Let's see what can be done jointly on the issue of nuclear energy and weapons including” [16].

Some American doctors arrived at the Soviet Union on a private initiative to help the victims in the treatment of radiation sickness, leukemia and bone marrow transplantation. Among them was a specialist from the USA, Dr. Gale, whose achievements most often sound in the memories of the liquidators [20].

On the one hand, the country was condemned for withholding information and negligence in relation to nuclear energy, it significantly weakened its status with financial losses and the absolute unwillingness of the authorities to accept the state of emergency in the region, and on the other hand, Chernobyl became a major precedent in the conditions of the cold war, catalyzing international sympathy for the Soviet Union.

Four months after the disaster, the international conference took place in Vienna with the participation of technical experts and representatives of international organizations. They underwent discussion of the causes of the disaster and the methods of its elimination, reports from Soviet scientists were heard, but the foreign aid was not provided to Ukraine until the collapse of the USSR. Thus, using the example of Soviet Chernobyl, the world community was shown a set of problems of nuclear realities, in particular: the harm of the information blockade, the threat of an uncontrolled atom, its impact on the ecology and human life, the imperfection of modern technologies and the danger of the development of the Cold War. These factors appealed to a balanced international interaction. The indirect influence of the Chernobyl tragedy on the bipolar world began.

For many decades since World War II, the Soviet Union held a confrontational position in relation

to the United States. The nuclear powers were two explosive poles. At the beginning of Gorbachev's reign, the ideas of partner relations with the West were perceived by the Soviet state apparatus with hostility. "What other new thinking? We have the right mindset. Let Americans change their thinking" [21], – BN Ponomarev, Secretary of the Party Central Committee, commented on the proposals for changes in the Foreign Ministry. Long-term members of the CPSU and the head of state stood on opposite sides of the barricades. The new leader needed new advisers, and Edward Shevardnadze was appointed head of the Foreign Ministry.

At the time Gorbachev came to power, the already not simple relations between the states were again complicated. The American President called the USSR an "evil empire" and did not intend to make concessions in the direction of its new head. Gorbachev was set up a compromise and in 1985 he met with Reagan in Geneva. Politicians were talking about nuclear weapons. The Soviet side proposed a plan to reduce the strategic missiles of the USSR in exchange for the United States abandoning the PIO space weapons they were developing. However, the meeting did not bring any practical results. Even the scale of the arms race did not force NATO leaders to give up their interests. In the same year, on the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, the USSR announced a moratorium on nuclear explosions. The United States, in turn, did not see the need to stop the tests of either the atom or the PIO.

The Chernobyl disaster made everybody look at the problem from a different angle. Consequently, it had an impact on the "levers", hidden in the depths of the authoritarian regime, non-public, but to make the leadership of the USSR to recognize the necessity of adjusting the internal and foreign policy. Let us turn to the assessment of events by the ruling elites themselves. Gorbachev's biographer devoted a small but important fragment to the role of disaster. According to him, the psychological barrier in the widespread reform activities was overcome in 1986, Chernobyl untied the hands of the Secretary General for more decisive action.

Gorbachev assessed the external situation of the USSR in 1986 as follows: "The Chernobyl tragedy was used as alleged evidence that we still do not intend to "open up", are insidious, do not deserve trust" [22].

In September 1986, the General Conference of the IAEA convened. A large role at it was assigned to the development of a reliable system of measures to prevent nuclear terrorism in all its manifestations. The conference report stated that initiatives to create an international regime for the safe development of nuclear energy were closely related to the problems of military detente and nuclear disarmament.

Exactly a month later, at the initiative of Gorbachev, a meeting was held with Reagan in Reykjavik. The Soviet Union, which suffered catastrophic economic losses to eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl and the construction of a sarcophagus, focused mainly on protecting it from new unpredictable attacks on the territory of the state using unexplored PIO technologies. The explosion of the reactor in Pripyat and the spread of the nuclear cloud turned out to be little sensitive to lead to mutual agreements between the US and the USSR on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The US side convinced the USSR that it did not intend to use the SDI for an attack on the Union, in turn, the American representatives, led by Reagan, said, the SDI would be able to remove all nuclear energy from the application. Gorbachev set his goal fully on the Disarmament. For the first time in history, the Soviet Secretary General proposed the elimination of half of their land-based strategic missiles. However, the agreement with the amendment on the preservation of space weapons was not signed. The public acceptance was tense. The Secretary General described the summit in Reykjavik as follows: "Reagan had three steps to go to become a great president" [21].

In 1987, an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and short-range nuclear missiles was reached in 1987 through long multi-stage negotiations at the highest level, visits by the US Secretary of State to Moscow and meetings in Washington, accompanied by mistrust, concessions and debates. Considering that the USSR had 4 times more of them than the Americans, the treaty is considered unprofitable for the Soviet Union. Despite unprecedented concessions, the document played a key role in reducing the threat of nuclear conflicts.

Total, "new thinking" has succeeded in working to end the nuclear arms race. The Chernobyl disaster catalyzed the emerging international cooperation, showed that it is impossible

to hide from its consequences even behind the iron curtain. The following important international documents were adopted: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or a Radiological Emergency.

Later, Ukraine and Belarus will be given humanitarian support from Sweden, international programs and mutual aid funds will be organized for the victims of Chernobyl, the standards for handling nuclear power in the IAEA will be tightened, the construction of new nuclear power plants will be suspended. Gorbachev will say: “Chernobyl really opened my eyes, in a sense, my life was divided between before and after” [22]. The international resonance of a technogenic catastrophe will leave a trace in the history of nuclear energy, as well as in the sphere of international relations.

Thus, the Chernobyl catastrophe partly provoked strong distrust of the Soviet Union and its policy of information blockade on the part of other states which set in a serious doubt in the possibility of cooperation with the government of “new thinking” on equal mutually advantageous conditions. The public abroad was annoyed and frightened, but what happened inside the state itself?

The imperfection of information about the Chernobyl accident affected not only the neighboring states, but directly the population of the nearby Pripyat regions. At that time, when the main emission of radiation into the atmosphere occurred, the value of which was many times higher than what was permissible for a person, the residents of Pripyat and neighboring villages slept in their houses and lived for another day as usual: weddings were played, people walked in parks, prepared for May Day demonstrations [23]. “The radiation situation in Pripyat did not yet require immediate evacuation – it was postponed in order to avoid panic,” says the official version of the authorities [10].

The lack of reliable information is the first thing that citizens from contaminated areas have encountered. Residents were removed from Pripjat on April 27, 1986, and the next day the entire country learned about the Chernobyl nuclear power plant incident on television. People from Ukraine and Belarus tried to find out how dangerous the accident was, but during the first three weeks after the incident, they had to be content with only rumors.

“The governments of countries where nuclear accidents happened were never sufficiently frank,” such a comment was found in a book on the Chernobyl chronicles. Soviet officials, in response to advance questions, refer to the previously occurring nuclear accidents, in particular secret American Tsami Three-Mile-Island and noted the broad practice of classifying information about the consequences of nuclear emissions [10]. However, is it possible to prevent such an attitude to Chernobyl, radiological equivalent of which is a thousand times superior to the accident in the United States?

The management made a decision that the people should not witness the weakness of the system. At first, no one knew what to do, and therefore human heroism was used. Such an approach to solving vital problems could not but generate distrust and confusion among citizens. They tried to hush up the disaster for as long as possible. Thanks to intelligence and meteorological measurements, the Western services had more information about what had happened than the Soviet people themselves. Domestic newspapers either put messages on the accident on the last pages, or wrote articles about the heroism of the liquidators. In the meantime, people were in the dark about the state of water, the implementation of radiation monitoring of food products, the dangers of both internal and external radiation.

It cannot be denied that the Soviet specialists, as well as the government apparatus, were not prepared to deal with an incident of this magnitude. In the state, robotics was not developed sufficiently to completely replace human losses in the aftermath of the explosion, there were no developed technologies for extinguishing fires in reactors, and workers' means of protection. “Chernobyl became the first test of blindness, and it failed,” – said E. Shevardnadze years later [19].

The orientation of the new political course on publicity has been undermined. According to the reports of the secret meetings in the Politburo, dedicated to health care, “the publication of data on the number and condition of victims in the hospital was recognized as expedient ..., taking into account the fact that American specialists work in this hospital” [16]. Further protocols talked about the identification of children with 500 diseases, which is five times

higher than the cancer dose. At the same time, the reports of the Ministry of Health indicate the absence of diseases due to the radiation factor. The nuclear physicist Gerashchenko, who was in Kiev in 1986, testified in his book afterwards the details of the disaster. "The irradiated people brought to Kiev were not even tried to be treated". The city did not have enough blood for transfusions and bone marrow for transplantation to several tens of thousands of people at once [16].

The problem of publicity was discussed immediately after the Chernobyl accident. Politburo members had long argued whether it was worth giving priority information to socialist countries or the Soviet people, which versions of the incident should be offered to European countries.

According to the official version, which will later be included into the circulation of books on Chernobyl's memory and memoirs, Gorbachev said at a meeting of the Politburo: "The system was overwhelmed by subservience, flattery and embellishment of the truth ... persecution of critics, boasting, protectionism and cronyism of the leadership. There was an accident in Chernobyl, and no one was ready – neither civil defense, nor medical institutions. They didn't even prepare the minimum required number of dosimeters" [22].

Already years later, Chernyaev would conclude about the role of Chernobyl: "... we cannot hide anything: not only in the sense of the accident, but also in the sense of what happens in our economy, what happens in our society, if we really want normal develop. In this sense, this tragedy gave impetus – as I now formulate – to transform publicity as a party policy to spread the ideas of restructuring, that is, in the old sense of the problem, into real freedom of speech" [24].

In addition to the lack of publicity, which was a perennial feature of the state, the case concerned the axis of ideological aspects. The Soviet Union was a pioneer in using the energy of the peaceful atom. The atomic potential was something indestructible, something for which Soviet scientists were so happy and the heads of state competed. The disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant destroyed all government assurances about the safety of nuclear power, questioned the qualifications of the personnel of Soviet nuclear power plants and their very

existence. For the people accustomed to believe in the greatness of their state, this incident simply could not happen. The country's ideology, which was undergoing some changes due to the new course of power, had to face additional difficulties.

Indeed, Chernobyl demonstrated an undermining from within the state. "The huge gaping crater of the 4th power unit exposed deep cracks in the state. Chernobyl is the bell ringing the system", said the Soviet historian and political scientist who studied the phenomenon of Chernobyl, D. Volkogonov. The crisis directly affected the economy of the Soviet Union: economic losses of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia in the years 1986-1989 exceeded 9.2 billion rubles. Exact numbers are difficult to give today to the governments of each of the republics. Confidential reports state that in these conditions the decision was made to dilute across the Union "clean" infected meat in a proportion of ¼ and it was delivered to the markets of the country. In addition, the environment, groundwater, forests and wildlife have been exposed to gigantic ecological catastrophe. In the plant world of the exclusion zone mutations began. Another problem was the psychological damage of an entire social group. Chernobyl victims were aware of themselves isolated from society, they were prone to suicide, bouts of despair, self-pity, were afraid for themselves and their offspring, the victims could not get a number of positions, were dependent on government payments.

Chernobyl catalyzed the growth of discontent. It is no coincidence that KGB messages about the emergence of new protest movements in the Ukrainian SSR fall precisely in 1986. Already in the summer of this year, there were signals about the distribution of leaflets of anti-Soviet content. In 1987, for the first anniversary of the tragedy, mass protests were prepared against the authorities' scrutiny of the truth about the accident; the population complained about insufficient assistance. As a result, already by 1990, Ukraine's citizens began to realize that independence would bring them more benefits. They themselves will be able to choose the path of development of the country and nuclear energy in it.

On the whole, the system could not cope with complex problems in all spheres of life and under the influence of catalytic factors, an

important role among which was played by Chernobyl, the Soviet Union collapsed.

The territory of 30 km around Pripyat, still remains a zone of alienation, a reminder of the tragic day of April 26, 1986, its mistakes and exploits, bureaucracy and sacrifice, all the lessons learned in relation to the atom. Chernobyl made it clear that the world more than ever needs cooperation, a revision of confrontational issues, a balanced policy within states. The disaster showed that first of all, people want to hear competent and intelligible answers to the questions of vital importance from the government, the media and international organizations.

Many of the problems posed by Chernobyl have not been solved yet. Difficult questions remain about the financing of modern work at nuclear power plants, unauthorized deforestation in the alienation zone, and the recycling of contaminated metal. Of great concern is the possibility of building a nuclear waste storage facility for the European part of the continent near Pripyat. The foreseeable future of uninhabited Pripyat remains unknown: will it become a full-fledged object of tourist routes and stalkers' paths or will it retain its non-entry status?

The research has shown that the history of any state – from its formation to the fall – stands on the pillars of the viability of all its spheres. The Chernobyl tragedy penetrated all regions of the country. The accident pointed to the place of rotting supports of the Soviet regime. As a litmus paper, the disaster first showed the imperfections of the state, and then acted as a catalyst for their gain. The ecological disaster which began in 1986 started a period of gradual disintegration of a superpower. It took only five years for the USSR to disappear from the map of the world.

References

1. Yaroshinskaya A. Chernobyl. Big lie. M., 2011. P.73.
2. Illesh A. V., Pralnikov A. E. Report of their Chernobyl. M. 1988. P. 139–156.
3. Foreign Relations of the US. 1981–1988. Vol. VI. Washington. 2016. P. 4–10.
4. Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster: Gorbachev Speaks, May 14, 1986 // ABC News. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0k3wnXBE5S0> (date of the application: 02.04.2018).
5. Discovery Channel. Chernobyl disaster. News. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uvAlWPeGEyY> (date of the application: 08.04.2018).
6. Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe. UN. News. URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/nuc_catastrophe_prevention.html (date of the application: 20.04.2018).
7. Helsinki Declaration. OSCE. URL: <https://www.osce.org/ru/mc/39505> (date of the application: 20.04.2018).
8. Chernyaev A. S. Chernyaev Diaries. URL: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/eng/text_files/Chernyaev/1985.pdf (date of the application: 27.04.2018).
9. International scale of nuclear and radiological events of the IAEA. URL: https://www.IAEA.org/sites/default/files/ines_rus.pdf (date of the application: 23.04.2018).
10. Wozniak V. Ya., Kovalenko A. P., Troitsky S. N. Chernobyl: events and lessons. M. 1989. P. 5–260.
11. Sweden Russian Radio. URL: <https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2103&artikel=6355829> (date of the application: 28.04.2018).
12. Remembering Chernobyl, from Finland News. URL: <https://112.international/opinion/remembering-chernobyl-from-finland-4270.html> (date of the application: 28.04.2018).
13. Remembering Chernobyl, from Serbia. URL: <https://112.international/opinion/remembering-chernobyl-from-serbia-4342.html> (date of the application: 28.04.2018).
14. The message of the program about Chernobyl Time from 04.04.1986. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VG6eI-uAfLoM> (date of the application: 02.04.2018).
15. Soviet announces nuclear accident at electric plant. NYT Archive. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/29/world/soviet-announces-nuclear-accident-at-electric-plant.html> (date of the application: 29.04.2018).
16. ABC News Nightline: Chernobyl Accident – 04/28/86. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_uOSImPSi8 (date of the application: 30.04.2018).
17. The Reagan Diaries, edited by Douglas Brikley. New York, 2007. 408 p.
18. Kaibysheva L. S. After Chernobyl. Vol. 1. M., 1996. 38 p.

19. Shevardnadze E. My Choice. In defense of democracy and freedom. M., 1991. P. 200–364.
20. Internet viewing for pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical drugs / professional medical portal. URL: <http://www.mif-ua.com/archive/article/35893> (date of the application: 31.05.2018).
21. William Taubman. Gorbachev: His Life and Times. P. 2–400.
22. Gorbachev M. S. Life and reform. Book 2. URL: <http://www.gorby.ru/gorbachev/> zhizn_i_reformy2/page_2/ (date of the application: 01.06.2018).
23. Interview about Chernobyl // Russian newspaper. URL: <https://rg.ru/2016/04/25/tridcat-let-nazad-proizoshla-avariia-na-chernobylskoj-aes.html> (date of the application: 07.06.2018).
24. Interview Assistant to the President of the USSR AS Chernyaeva BBC World Service. URL: http://www.gorby.ru/presscenter/news/show_29652/ (date of the application: 01.06.2018).

ВЛИЯНИЕ ЧЕРНОБЫЛЬСКОЙ КАТАСТРОФЫ НА МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ

А. Ю. Прокофьева

В статье рассматриваются вопросы международной реакции на глобальные экологические катастрофы. Последствия таких катастроф оказывают значительное влияние на мировое сообщество. Катастрофа в Чернобыле повлияла не только на территорию, оказавшуюся под воздействием радиации, но и на всю страну, частью которой она являлась. Внешняя политика СССР претерпела изменения, поскольку произошел значительный сдвиг в отношениях с другими государствами. Исследование показало, что значительные меры приняты мировым сообществом, чтобы избежать повтора подобной катастрофы. Автор полагает, что меры должны быть приняты и на уровне международных отношений.

Ключевые слова: внешняя политика, Советский Союз, экологическая катастрофа, международная реакция.

Статья поступила в редакцию 01.06.2019 г.

© Прокофьева А. Ю., 2019.

Прокофьева Алина Юрьевна (palinajj@gmail.com),
студент III курса исторического факультета Самарского университета,
443086, Россия, г. Самара, Московское шоссе, 34.