КАК РОССИЯ И НАТО МОГУТ СОСУЩЕСТВОВАТЬ ВО ВРЕМЯ «ИНФОРМАЦИОННОЙ» И «ГИБРИДНОЙ» ВОЙН?

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Introduction

The current condition of relations between Russia and the West, which consists of the NATO member-states, tends to chaotization and elimination of the institutions providing the architecture of regional and global security.

Both Russia and NATO are concerned about ensuring their security. Russian actions to strengthen their defenses (modernization of the army, military exercises) are viewed by NATO as a threat to the security of its member countries. At the same time, the expansion of NATO to the east (the admission of Eastern European countries into the ranks of the Alliance, with the ensuing conduct of military exercises, the introduction of Western standards, and the creation of new military infrastructure) is viewed by Russia as bringing the Alliance closer to the Russian borders. Here we see a classic manifestation of the "zero-sum game" when the success of one side in defending its security is perceived by the other side as a threat to its security and leads to countermeasures.

Moreover, it’s possible to use the concept of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen school of security studies to describe actors’ moves [1]. Official documents in the field of security, such as the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, NATO 2030 Report, especially the concepts and strategies of national security of the Alliance member-states, define each other in the categories of “military threats” (in case of Russia) and immediate existential threats (in case of NATO and member countries). The parties concerned or "securitized" certain aspects of international interaction: they translate them into the category of threats to the existence or integrity of the state or security in the region, which makes it possible to use or "legitimize" extraordinary means to counter this threat.

The situation is complicated by the use of images of "friend or foe" associated with the rhetoric of securitization in order to resolve the domestic issues rather than those of foreign policy. Such attitude is typical of both sides, for Russia to a lesser degree than for the "West" due to the more heterogeneous nature of the "West" itself.

We consider it vital that the two key terms of modern “cold war v 2.0”  ‘information’ and ‘hybrid’ wars be clarified in order to answer the question: “How could NATO and Russia co-exist in the time of “information” and “hybrid” wars?”

Methods and Results

This paper attempts to spot the problem areas in harmonizing the interpretation of the terms “information” and “hybrid” warfare on the part of NATO and Russian decision makers. In addition, we offer some possible solutions to mitigating the tensions between the conflicting parties and to managing the risks in an attempt to avoid the escalation of the conflict.

To achieve these goals we, first of all, investigated the interaction of global and regional security agenda and the actions of the parties involved in the course of “information” and “hybrid” warfare. Secondly, we analyzed the use of ‘information and hybrid warfare’ terms in NATO and Russian official papers. Thirdly, we explored the origins of key concepts as they are used in political discourse.

We investigated the data on a unit level of analysis (Russia and NATO) as well as on a subunit level (different groups of analysts).

Within the framework of the Russian academic tradition which draws on the constructivist approach to the international relations, we consider the reviewed literature as a primary source of information (except the concept of securitization).

Discussion

The current tensions between the West and Russia are the topic of concern in the academic circles. Take for example the doomsday clock [2] showing 100 seconds to midnight in 2021, which is the closest to the apocalypse time in the entire history. Another instance of concern is the Project “Russia – NATO Dialogue. How to alleviate tensions and avoid crises?” where the international analytical community, represented by former militaries, politicians and decision-makers call for the political leaders to demonstrate their political will in order to decrease the risk of full-scale confrontation [3].

Given these facts we argue that information and hybrid warfare forms the “gray zone of conflict”, which lowers the threshold of the armed conflict. It follows that the confrontation in the current global political situation, especially in Europe, gets more and more alarming, since the “information and hybrid war” can induce a global drama.

Comparing Russian and NATO official papers and declarations in the field of security and defense planning in terms of content and quantitative analysis shows the difference in the usage of the concepts ‘information and hybrid war(fare)’ by Russia and NATO (Table 1).

 Table 1.

Occurrences of “hybrid warfare” and “information warfare” in Russian and NATO documents.

Notes: * - the whole document describes the Russian Federation attitude to the information security, ** - NATO 2030 Report is an intermediate guideline between the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2010 and New Strategic Concept to be published soon, *** - the discourse was about the phenomenon of “disinformation”.

As is shown in Table 1, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ does not occur in the Russian doctrinal documents, while the number of ‘information warfare’ occurrences is almost twice as many as that in the NATO documents. It can be assumed that the frequency of references to the term ‘hybrid warfare’ in the NATO official papers points to a higher value of this term, on the one hand, and to the discrimination of the two terms, “information war” and “hybrid war” on the other hand.

The term ‘information warfare’ seems to trace back to ‘Information Operations’ defined in the Directive of U.S. Department of Defense: “Information Operations actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information, and information systems <…> Information Warfare is conducted during the time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries” [10].

American and Russian military analysts traditionally consider information warfare as part of military science, which belongs to the terminological field “WAR”. In other words, this term is well investigated in the military science, both theoretical and applied. So in military analytical circles of different countries there are a number of tools within the defensive and offensive strategies of waging the information warfare.

Andrey Manoilo, Russian analyst, remarks that the term emerged in the Russian academic discourse as a borrowing of "information-psychological warfare" (IPW) from the US Military dictionary. However, in Russian academic papers it was rendered as информационно-психологическая война (a loan translation of the English term), and as “информационное противоборство” (literally, information confrontation, war). Depending on the context, it is possible to use either the former or the latter version of translation. This ambiguity of translation brought about the division of modern Russian scholars into two rival groups: 1) supporters of "information psychological warfare" 2) and those of "information war", although in the original language they are essentially the same” [11].

As to the definition of the term  ‘information warfare’, Andrey Manoilo divides the authors investigating “information warfare” (IW) into 3 groups: the first group interprets the concept of information warfare as the individual information activities and operations, information methods and means of corporate competition within interstate confrontation or armed struggle; the second group consists of the representatives of the military departments, both foreign and Russian who refer IW to the sphere of military confrontation; and the last group considers IW as a phenomenon of a de-jure peaceful period of interstate confrontation, which makes it possible to solve foreign policy tasks in a non-violent way in the traditional sense” [12].

The issue of hybrid warfare, on the contrary, is less explored by any analysts despite a good number of publications in Russia and abroad. According to Frank Hoffman, «Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder» [13].

The Military Balance 2015, a yearbook published by International Institute of Strategic Studies and one of the most respected military analytical papers, defines the hybrid warfare as “methods which include the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages via diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure” [14].

1. S. Gadzhiev mentions the difference between traditional and hybrid wars. He identifies “the whole spectrum of available military and non-military forms, means, methods, and technologies of ideological, informational, cultural, economic, geo-economic, political, geopolitical and other manifestations of confrontation” [15].

In Russian academia the term hybrid warfare seems to be in the making yet, which might explain its absence in Russian official papers. Dmitry Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center  suggests spelling the emerging term “Hybrid War”, in capital letters to emphasize its special role in the history of international relations and describing the new confrontation [between Russia and USA] more accurately as well as “Cold War” describes the confrontations between USSR and USA[16]. Joshua Ball, editor-in-chief of “Global Security Review” defines the “hybrid war” as follows: «The term “hybrid war” (military institutions use the term “hybrid threat”) connotes the use of conventional military force supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics. In practical application, the Russian concept of “nonlinear conflict” is an example of hybrid warfare strategy» [17].

However, Marina Kuchinskaya, another Russian analyst, addressing the problem of “hybrid warfare” assumes that “The corresponding universal conceptual apparatus (especially one that is internationally agreed) has not been developed, which results in a variety of ‘hybrid warfare’ definitions [18, p. 122]. She further suggests that one of the most important characteristics of hybrid war is “its vagueness and uncertainty”, because it implies the implementation of destabilizing and subversive measures during the period that does not belong in its pure form to the conditions of war or peace” [18, p. 123].

The uncertain status of the term ‘hybrid warfare’ in the Russian academic discourse is supported by Dr Fridman in his interview “Hybrid War of Terms” in which he says  that this term emerged after the West began to accuse Russia of waging ‘a hybrid war’ in Ukraine, so Russia decided to figure out what a hybrid war is. Professor Tsygankov from Moscow State University also remarks : "Western partners accuse us of allegedly waging a hybrid war, so let's understand what this is all about" [19] In view of that, several major seminars and conferences were organized at Moscow State University, the Military University, and the Financial University. There were several round tables with the participation of both academic and military specialists. However, Dr. Fridman also mentioned that «the use of military and non-military means discussed in military and political discourse in Russia, can be traced back to three conceptions of the 2000s: a) the revival of Eugene Messner's concept of “mutiny” (according with his book “Mutiny, or the Name of the Third World War”) b) the emergence of ‘network-centric war’ proposed by Alexander Dugin, c) the development of information war theory  by Igor Panarin and other scholars. Although the three conceptions were elaborated quite independently, they had much in common, as they discussed approximately the same idea - the undermining of the adversary's political legitimacy from within [20]».

Overall, the study of scholarly and analytical literature shows the difference in understanding the two terms under consideration. In academia there exists a diversity of views and definitions of hybrid and information warfare. What complicates literature review is that both in Russia and in the West there are two types of research: one being academic study, the other being military analyses. In addition, Russian and Western scholars admit that the concepts of information and hybrid wars originate in military discourse. However, neither the Russian nor the Western experts offer clear-cut or unique definitions of both terms. Therefore, it is essential that a new methodology and rethinking of the traditional approaches to the IR should be developed. It could be advisable that military analytics should be also embraced in order to fill in the gaps in comprehending the terms ‘information and hybrid warfare.

Conclusions

Summing up, one can say that the stumbling blocks in addressing the question “How could NATO and Russia co-exist in the time of “information” and “hybrid” wars?” are the following:

1. NATO and Russia understand and interpret each of the terms differently in all levels of analysis (political, expert, military). Moreover, the lack of unanimity between the analytical and academic circles as well as the good number of references to the definitions found in military papers and reports by Russian and Western parties concerned complicates comprehension and reduces the possibility of any form of dialogue, political, expert, or military. This fact could be considered the first obstacle to cooperation.
2. The intervention of the concepts originated in the military to the political discourse could result in fixing the terms in academic literature and official papers, which is the desire of international relations actors to use the so-called “gray zone of confrontation” for their own purposes. We consider it the second obstacle for cooperation and coexistence and the successful act of “securitization”.

In light of the above considerations, we could offer at least two ways of resolving this “information” and “hybrid” stalemate.

1. The coexisting way. The actors involved should investigate the most urgent problems of mutual misunderstanding using the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki 1973-1975, resulting in The Helsinki Final Act, which institutionalized the principles of coexistence, and conventionalized the rules of warfare along with the limits of rivalry. To this end it could be reasonable to use the Recommendations originated in the Project “Russia – NATO Dialogue” How to alleviate tensions and avoid crises?» [3].
2. The cooperative way. It could be advisable that both parties should start the process of “desecuritisation” based on mutual agreement. But the current tendency for securitization in global policy eliminates this option.

Об авторах

Егор Сергеевич Симанов

Автор, ответственный за переписку.
Email: simanegor@mail.ru

студент IV курса исторического факультета

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